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CORPORATE LAW CONSTRAINTS ON
POLITICAL SPENDING
BY JAMES KWAK*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2008 and 2009, a financial panic nearly crippled the global
economy and plunged the United States into the most severe economic
downturn since the Great Depression, costing over eight million jobs. In
June 2009, the administration of President Barack Obama announced its
proposals to reform the financial system that had made this crisis
possible.' One of its central recommendations was the creation of the
Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), a new regulator
devoted to protecting ordinary people from the risks presented by
financial products such as mortgages and credit cards. 2 The CFPA was
deeply unpopular with many businesses, particularly the financial
institutions who created and sold the products that the Agency was
supposed to protect consumers from. The fight against the CFPA was
led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a lobbying and advocacy
organization that claims to represent the interests of over three million
businesses. 3 The Chamber spent millions of dollars on an advertising
campaign attempting to demonize the Agency and helped organize the
opposition under the banner "Stop the CFPA." 4 After the Consumer
* Associate Professor and William T. Golden Scholar, University of Connecticut School of
Law. This paper was originally written for The Political Economy of Financial Regulation, a
conference held on February 7-8, 2013, and hosted by the George Washington University
Center for Law, Economics & Finance; the Insurance Law Center at the University of
Connecticut School of Law; the Center for Banking and Finance at the University of North
Carolina School of Law; and the Institute for Law and Economic Policy. I thank the
participants in that conference for their comments and suggestions, and the University of
Connecticut School of Law for financial support.
1. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING
FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION
AND
REGULATION
(2009),
available at

http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport-web.pdf.
2. See generally id. at 55-63.
3.

About

the

U.S.

Chamber of Commerce, U.S.

CHAMBER

OF COMMERCE,

http://www.uschamber.com/about (last visited May 20, 2013).
4. Brody Mullins, Chamber Ad Campaign Targets Consumer Agency, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 8, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI25236911298191113.html.
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Financial Protection Bureau 5 (CFPB) was created by the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 6
the Chamber has continued lobbying to weaken the Bureau and opposed
the appointment of its first director.7
So far, so good: the Chamber of Commerce is an interest group,
like many other interest groups, that has the right and the ability to
advocate for its preferred policies. The Chamber and its political
activities, however, are funded by contributions from member
companies, many of which (and the largest of which) are public
corporations. The Chamber takes positions on a wide range of political
issues, not just financial regulation. Some of its positions probably
could be characterized as generically "pro-business," such as its support
for infrastructure investment. 8 Some, however, tend to favor some
sectors of the business community over others, such as its support for
free-trade policies. 9 And some have little to do with the health of
American businesses and more to do with the distribution of the surplus
generated by those businesses, such as its positions on individual
income tax rates.' 0 In short, many of the Chamber's activities are not
necessarily in the interests of each of the corporations that fund those
activities.
Those corporations are owned by their shareholders and, in
principle, ultimately governed by and for the benefit of those
shareholders. In theory, therefore, they should not be spending money to
support policies that do not provide value to their true owners. In
5. The administration originally proposed to call this new agency the Consumer
Financial Protection Agency. The agency that was eventually created by the Dodd-Frank
Act, however, is named the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
6. Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
7. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Expresses
Disappointment in Move to Advance CFPB Director Nomination (Oct. 6, 2011), available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/20 11/october/us-chamber-expressesdisappointment-move-advance-cfpb-director-nominatio.
8. See Reliable and Secure Infrastructure, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.uschamber.com/infrastructure (last visited May 20, 2013). Still, one could argue
that the use of taxpayer dollars to pay for domestic physical infrastructure is not in the
interests of corporations that make relatively little use of that physical infrastructure, either
because of the nature of their operations or because much of their operations are located in
other countries.
9.

See International Trade and Investment, U.S.

CHAMBER

OF COMMERCE,

http://www.uschamber.com/trade (last visited May 20, 2013).
10. Individual

Taxes,

U.S.

CHAMBER

OF

COMMERCE,

http://www.uschamber.com/issues/econtax/bush-tax-cuts (last visited May 20, 2013).
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practice, however, decisions to support particular political organizations
and causes are generally made by company executives, occasionally
with oversight by the board of directors, but without meaningful input
from shareholders. Contributions to the Chamber and to similar
organizations are a way for directors and officers to use corporate assets
to influence the political process in ways that may or may not benefit
their shareholders.
The issue for shareholders is how to ensure that their
corporations' political activities are actually in the interest of
shareholders. This is a particular example of the central question of
corporate governance: how to ensure that the actions taken by directors
and officers are good for shareholders. Governance of corporate
political activity has become particularly salient since the Supreme
Court's

2010

decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election

Commission," which, along with the D.C. Circuit's subsequent decision
in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission,12 made possible

unlimited corporate contributions to "independent expenditure
committees" that do not contribute to or coordinate their activities with
political candidates. These judicial decisions significantly increased the
potential volume and impact of corporate political activity, raising the
stakes for shareholders who are concerned about misuse of corporate
funds for extraneous political purposes.
This paper asks how, if at all, existing corporate law ensures that
corporate insiders only engage in political activity that benefits the
corporation and therefore its owners. Shareholders have certain tools to
influence corporate actions before they occur, including the ability to
elect directors and to vote on particular proposals included on a
corporation's proxy statement. Because these tools give them little
control over a corporation's political activities, I focus on their principal
remaining lever: a derivative lawsuit challenging political spending that
is allegedly harmful to the corporation. I argue that shareholders can
challenge corporate political expenditures in court and that courts
should carefully scrutinize those expenditures to ensure that they are not
tainted by a conflict of interest and that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that they are in the best interest of the corporation.
Part II of this paper briefly describes the types of political
11.
12.

558U.S.310(2010).
599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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expenditures available to corporations and the legal issues raised by
corporate political activity.1 3 Part III summarizes the duties owed to
shareholders by directors and officers under existing corporate law.14 In
Part IV, I discuss how these duties should be applied to corporate
political expenditures.' 5 Part V addresses the particular questions raised
by contributions to charitable organizations that engage in political
activity.16 Part VI discusses whether the arguments of this paper raise
any First Amendment issues regarding the freedom of speech of
corporations.' 7 Part VII concludes by comparing heightened judicial
scrutiny of political activity to other reforms that have been proposed
recently.' 8
II. CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY

A.

Options

Corporations may attempt to influence politics through a variety
of channels. Corporations, like unions, may not donate money directly
to electoral candidates or to party organizations.1 9 They may, however,
establish affiliated political action committees (PACs). 20 The
corporation pays the administrative and fundraising expenses of the
PAC, which raises money from employees and shareholders of the
corporation and then makes contributions directly to electoral
candidates or political parties. Those contributions are subject to
relatively low dollar limits. 2 1
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that corporations
may make unlimited independent expenditures on political

13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. See infra Part VII.
19. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012). Citizens United invalidated § 441b as applied to "corporate
independent expenditures," but did not invalidate its prohibition on direct corporate
contributions to candidates or parties. 558 U.S. at 365.
20. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).
21.

Contribution

Limits

2013-14,

FED.

ELECTION

COMM'N,

http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml (last visited May 20, 2013).
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communications, including those intervening directly in elections. For
example, a corporation may finance, produce, and distribute its own
advertisements supporting or attacking particular candidates. In
practice, most major corporations have little interest in producing
political advertisements, in part because they would then have to
disclose their role in paying for and producing those advertisements.
More relevant to them was the D.C. Circuit's decision in
SpeechNow.org, which allowed unlimited contributions to "independent
expenditure committees"-organizations that engage in political
activity independently of specific candidates or parties. 23 These
decisions made possible the formation of "super PACs," which can
accept unlimited contributions and engage in any type of political
communications, so long as they avoid explicitly coordinating their
activities with a candidate or party. These organizations played an
important role in the 2012 elections, particularly in the Republican
presidential primary, in which each candidate was supported by a
technically independent super PAC. In the 2012 election cycle, super
PACs spent over $600 million, led by Restore Our Future (supporting
Mitt Romney) at $142 million, American Crossroads (a conservative
group led by strategist Karl Rove) at $104 million, and Priorities USA
Action (supporting Barack Obama) at $65 million.24
The downside of super PACs, from the standpoint of individuals
or corporations that want to engage in politics, is that they must disclose
their contributors. This is one potential reason why corporations, in
general, did not make large contributions to super PACs. Instead, there
are three other major types of political intermediaries that corporations
can donate to and that are not required to disclose their contributors,
each a tax-exempt nonprofit organization defined in the Internal
Revenue Code. The Chamber of Commerce is an example of a
501(c)(6) organization, a category that includes "business leagues,
chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or
professional football leagues." 25 "Social welfare" organizations are
those "operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare" under

22.
23.

558 U.S.at 365.
599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

24.

Super

PA Cs,

OPENSECRETS.ORG,

http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2012 (last visited May 20, 2013).
25. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012).
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section 501(c)(4).2 6 Both 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6) organizations may
intervene directly in political campaigns, including supporting or
attacking candidates, so long as this intervention does not constitute
their primary activity; they may spend unlimited amounts on
educational activities (including issue advertisements) related to their
core purpose; and they are allowed to engage in unlimited lobbying
activities related to that purpose.27 Conceptually, that means that they
are able to spend forty-nine percent of their money on advertisements
that advocate for or against a particular candidate and the rest on issue
advertisements. These organizations may have to disclose their electoral
expenditures to the Federal Election Commission, but they do not have
to disclose contributions unless they are earmarked for specific
activities-so donations to their general funds need never be made
public.
Tax-exempt 501(c) organizations have become major players in
electoral politics, spending over $300 million in the 2012 election cycle,
led by Crossroads Grassroots Political Strategies (Crossroads GPS, a
conservative group led by Karl Rove) at $71 million, Americans for
Prosperity (a conservative group backed by the Koch brothers) at $36
million, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce at $35 million.28 Because
they are not required to disclose their donors, these 501(c) groups make
it possible for contributors to influence elections in secret. In one case,
the head of a 501(c)(4), asking potential donors for money to fund a
political advertising campaign, said, "Contributions to the [Republican
Jewish Coalition] are not reported. We don't make our donors' names
available. We can take corporate money, personal money, cash, shekels,
whatever you got." 29
Finally, traditional 501(c)(3) charitable organizations-those
"organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
26. 26 U.S.C.
27.

§ 501(c)(4).

JOHN FRANCIS REILLY & BARBARA A. BRAIG ALLEN, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AND LOBBYING ACTIVITIES OF IRC 501(C)(4), (c)(5), AND (C)(6)
ORGANIZATIONS, at L-2 - L-3 (2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-

tege/eotopicl03.pdf.
28.

2012

Outside

Spending,

by

Group,

OPENSECRETS.ORG,

http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt-V&disp=O&typ
e=U (last visited May 20, 2013).
29. Kim Barker, How Nonprofits Spend Millions on Elections and Call It Public
Welfare, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofitsspend-millions-on-elections-and-call-it-public-welfare.
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testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals" 30 -also engage in politics,
albeit under greater restrictions than (c)(4) and (c)(6) organizations.
Politically oriented think tanks, for example, are typically section
501(c)(3) organizations, ranging from the conservative Heritage
Foundation to the liberal Center for American Progress. These think
tanks are also an important part of inside-the-Beltway political
networks. The Brookings Institution, for example, has been an
important source of government officials in the Obama administration.
The Center for American Progress was founded by John Podesta,
formerly chief of staff under President Clinton, while Senator Jim
DeMint recently resigned to become president of Heritage. Other
entities organized under section 501(c)(3) are able to engage in
activities that closely resemble lobbying, providing donors with
privileged access to elected officials. For example, the Congressional
Sportsmen's Foundation receives funding from the National Rifle
Association and the trade organization for the firearms industry and
includes executives from major manufacturers of guns and ammunition
on its board. 31 The Foundation, which opposes proposed gun control
measures, regularly hosts events bringing together industry
representatives and legislators, particularly members of the
Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus. 32
In addition, social welfare organizations and charitable
organizations are often paired with overt political committees, including
super PACs. American Crossroads is a super PAC; its sister
organization, Crossroads GPS, is a section 501(c)(4) social welfare
organization. This allows the overall organization to funnel money to
one entity or the other depending on various factors, including whether
donors are willing to have their contributions disclosed. This structure
has been widely adopted by other super PACs. For example, President
Obama's super PAC in the 2012 election, Priorities USA Action, had a
sister social welfare organization, Priorities USA.
Social welfare organizations are also often paired with section

30.
31.
7, 2013,
32.

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
Mike McIntire, Charity Takes Gun Lobby Closer to Its Quarry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
at Al.
Id.

258

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 18

501(c)(3) charitable organizations. For example, Americans for
Prosperity, an advocacy organization that spends heavily on electoral
politics, is a section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization. Its sister
organization, Americans for Prosperity Foundation, is a section
501(c)(3) charitable organization. This combination of a 501(c)(3) and a
501(c)(4) organization is common to many advocacy groups, including
the National Rifle Association, the National Abortion and Reproductive
Rights Action League, the American Conservative Union, the American
Association of Retired Persons, People for the American Way, the
NAACP, and the Sierra Club.3 3 Politically oriented think tanks often
spawn sister 501(c)(4) organizations, such as Heritage Action for
America (Heritage Foundation) and the Center for American Progress
Action Fund (Center for American Progress). This structure allows the
501(c)(3) entity to use tax-deductible contributions to fund research and
educational initiatives that, while politically oriented, do not violate the
Internal Revenue Service's ban on lobbying and electoral activities by
charitable organizations. The 501(c)(4) entity then uses nondeductible
contributions to engage in lobbying and electoral activities.
In general, we simply do not know to what extent corporations
are taking advantage of these various avenues for political activity,
because 501(c) organizations are not required to disclose their
contributors and, as discussed below, corporations are not required to
disclose their contributions. We do have some indications, however. For
example, in 2009, America's Health Insurance Plans, a trade group
funded by health insurers, donated $86 million to the Chamber of
Commerce, which "paid for advertisements, polling and grass roots
events to drum up opposition to the [health care reform] bill," according
to a Chamber spokesperson. 34 We also know that Citizens United and
SpeechNow.org, coupled with a campaign finance system that allows
nominally independent groups to raise and spend unlimited amounts of
money, gave corporations new ways to influence politics on an even
larger scale.

33. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora'sBox: ManagerialDiscretion and the Problem of
CorporatePhilanthropy,44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 656 (1997).
34. Drew Armstrong, Insurers Gave U.S. Chamber $86 Million Used to Oppose
Obama's Health Law, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201011-1 7/insurers-gave-u-s-chamber-86-million-used-to-oppose-obama-s-health-law.html.

2013]
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Policy andLegal Issues

The specter of large-scale corporate involvement in electoral
politics raises a number of important issues. The most obvious is
whether corporate political activity is good for democracy and for
society. I do not attempt to answer that question in this paper, which is
instead concerned with whether corporate political activity is good for
corporations and what their shareholders can do about it.
1. Shareholder Welfare
One possibility is that there is nothing for shareholders to worry
about because directors and officers only authorize political activity that
is good for their corporations, at least on an expected basis,35 and
therefore for shareholders. Indeed, this has been the assumption of
much corporate law scholarship over the past few decades. In 1981,
Victor Brudney claimed, "Doubtless the holders of the bulk of corporate
stock do not disagree with most political positions for which their
managements spend corporate funds." 36 A few years later, Roberta
Romano claimed, "Casual empiricism supports the contention that
corporate PACs and political expenditures are in fact vehicles for profit
maximization," citing the tendency of regulated firms to sponsor PACs
and the fact that companies typically intervened in state referenda that
would have a direct effect on their profitability. 37 More recently, Jill
Fisch also argued, "[C]orporate political participation is effective.
Corporations are able to exert substantial influence on regulatory policy
through their political activities and donations." 38 In addition, Robert
Sitkoff has claimed that market forces ensure that corporate insiders do
35. A corporation could spend money in support of a candidate who goes on to lose an
election, and therefore receive no direct benefit, but this is analogous to spending money on
a speculative research and development project that does not bear fruit. In either case, it is
plausible that the money spent was a good investment at the time, given the probability of
success and the expected payoff.
36. Victor Brudney, Business Corporationsand Stockholders' Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 237 (1981).
37. Roberta Romano, Metapoliticsand CorporateLaw Reform, 36 STAN. L. REv. 923,
995-96 (1984).
38. Jill E. Fisch, The "Bad Man" Goes to Washington, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1593,
1607 (2006); see also Jill E. Fisch, How Do CorporationsPlay Politics? The FedEx Story,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2005) ("[P]olitical activity is not a dispersion of shareholder
funds, but an integral and necessary part of a corporation's operating strategy.").
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not engage in political activity that is not supported by shareholders. 39
Corporations certainly do participate in politics to further their
own economic interests, and this is particularly true of firms in
regulated industries; consider the donation by America's Health
Insurance Plans to the Chamber of Commerce, for example, or the
massive and expensive lobbying campaign that financial institutions
have engaged in to weaken the Dodd-Frank Act and its accompanying
regulations. It does not necessarily follow, however, that all or even
most corporate political activity results in higher profits or share prices.
As Romano recognized, whether that activity is ultimately worthwhile
is empirically testable. 40 In the intervening years, many studies have
found reason to be skeptical.
A 2003 meta-analysis of studies comparing contributions by
PACs to subsequent legislators' votes found that "PAC contributions
show relatively few effects on voting behavior." 4 1 Based on their own
regression analysis of contributions by corporate and labor PACs, the
authors concluded, "[T]he evidence that campaign contributions lead to
a substantial influence on votes is rather thin." 42 Two more recent
papers that study a broader range of corporate political activity come to
even stronger conclusions. Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke, and
Tracy Yue Wang examined soft money donations to political partieS43
and donations to 527 committees. 44 They found that political donations
were associated with lower stock market returns 45 and that higher levels
of political spending were associated with poor corporate governance
39. Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the
Competitionfor CorporateCharters, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1103, 1115 (2002); see also David
G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in CorporateLaw: CorporateSocial Responsibility
After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1228 (2011) (arguing that the lack of
competition between states over corporate law regarding political activity "suggests that
corporate political speech tends to benefit shareholders, not harm them").
40. Romano, supra note 377, at 995.
41. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics? 17 J.
ECON. PERSP. 105, 114 (2003).
42. Id. at 116.
43. "Soft money" was not subject to federal limits and was used by political parties to
fund some of their activities. Corporate soft money contributions were banned by the
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
44. These are political organizations that are technically independent of particular
candidates or parties.
45. Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., CorporatePoliticalDonations:Investment or Agency?
14 Bus. & POL., no. 1, 2012 at 1, 14-21.
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practices, 46 implying that corporate insiders who are only weakly
controlled by shareholders are more likely to waste money on poor
political investments. Studying corporate PAC contributions and
lobbying activity, John C. Coates IV found that, outside heavily
regulated industries, political activity is associated with lower firm
valuations (as measured by Tobin's Q47) and is most common in
corporations with weak shareholder governance. 48 In addition, Coates
found that corporate political activity is most common in firms whose
CEO goes on to assume political office, 49 further strengthening the
suspicion that executives spend their companies' money for reasons
other than shareholder value maximization.
These findings give us reason to believe that political activity is
not simply a benign but risky type of corporate investment in which
some bets pay off, some don't, but on average money is well spent.
Instead, they imply that good political investments may be the exception
rather than the rule, and shareholders should be particularly worried
about the potential for political contributions to drain value out of their
corporations. These studies are hampered by the fact that they are, of
necessity, based solely on donations that corporations are required to
disclose, which may be only a small fraction of total political spending.
But if that publicly disclosed spending reveals poor investment choices
and agency costs, it seems that undisclosed spending would be even
more susceptible to those problems.
2. Possible Responses
Within the field of corporate law, most recent attention to the
question of political activity has been devoted to the issue of disclosure.
As discussed above, many political organizations do not have to
disclose the identity of their contributors. Since there is no general rule
that corporations must disclose their political spending, shareholders
cannot even begin to determine whether their corporations' political
activities are in their interests or not. This problem has provoked several
46.
47.
assets.
48.
Citizens
49.

Id. at 22-25.
Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets divided by the book value of
John C. Coates, IV, CorporatePolitics, Governance, and Value Before and After
United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 688 (2012).
Id.
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different responses from shareholders and academics.
Shareholders of many large corporations have attempted to
require disclosure of political spending by submitting proposals for
inclusion on proxy statements; during the 2012 proxy season, thirtynine of the companies in the S&P 100 index included such proposals on
their proxy statements.o In August 2011, a group of law professors
petitioned the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to require
disclosure of corporate political spending by all public companies under
the SEC's existing power to require corporations to make information
available to investors.5 Investors have also attempted to obtain
disclosure on the basis of shareholders' traditional rights to inspect a
corporation's books and records. In August 2012, for example, the New
York State Common Retirement Fund (NYSCRF) demanded that
Qualcomm provide information about its political spending.5 2 When
Qualcomm essentially refused to comply with the request, the NYSCRF
filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery under the books-andrecords provision of Delaware General Corporate Law; 53 the
corporation later agreed to disclose its political donations to
shareholders. 54
Mandatory disclosure of political spending would certainly be a
good thing.5 5 At a minimum, it would make it possible for the
institutions of shareholder democracy to ensure that such spending is
being put to appropriate uses. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Citizens
United seems to have assumed that such disclosure already existed:
50. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on CorporatePolitical
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 939 (2013). Thirty-one of those proposals were submitted by
institutional investors. Id. at 939 n.48. Not counting companies that had already agreed to
disclose their political spending, forty-five percent of companies in the S&P 100 index
included such proposals. Id. at 939.
51. Letter from Comm. on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Aug. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011 /petn4-637.pdf.
52. Verified Complaint for Inspection of Books and Records at 21, N.Y. State
Common Ret. Fund v. Qualcomm Inc., C.A. No. 8170 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2013), availableat
http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/Qualcommdata/qualcomm complaint.pdf.
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2013).
54. Dan Strumpf, Qualcomm Settles DisclosureSuit with New York, WALL ST. J., Feb.
22,
2013,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424127887323549204578320500077425818.html.
55. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 50, at 941-45; see also Jill E. Fisch,
Frankenstein'sMonster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of Corporate
PoliticalExpenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 587, 638-40 (1991).
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With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their
positions and supporters. Shareholders can determine whether their
corporation's political speech advances the corporation's interest in
making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are "'in
the pocket' of so-called moneyed interests." The First Amendment
protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and
shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper
way.56
But required disclosure is neither a panacea nor the sole possible
remedy to the problems presented by corporate political activity.
Disclosure-based regimes have had limited or no success in other areas
where insiders' interests may diverge from those of shareholders. For
example, new rules introduced by the SEC in 1992 requiring greater
disclosure of executive compensation had little discernible effect on the
overall upward trend of CEO compensation. 57
Furthermore, although disclosure alone would potentially curb
some questionable corporate political activities at the margin, it would
not on its own give shareholders the power to do anything substantive
about spending that they opposed for either political or shareholder
value reasons. They could of course choose to vote for alternative board
candidates, if a dissident group were to go to the lengths of opposing the
incumbent board. Given that political spending concerns are unlikely to
outweigh the more traditional issues of maximizing profits and share
prices, however, it seems unlikely that the typical shareholder will
withhold her vote from directors because they sign off on wasteful
political spending-and even more unlikely that a major institutional
investor will undertake the type of activist campaign or proxy fight
necessary for those votes to matter. Shareholders also cannot impose
their preferred policy for political expenditures on a corporation through
the proxy process, since any such proposal would have to be advisory in
nature.5 8
56. 558 U.S. 310, 370-71 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540
U.S. 93, 259 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
57. Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: ManagerialPower Versus
the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 856-57 (2002).
58. A corporation's operations must be managed by its board of directors, not directly
by shareholders. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2013). A corporation may reject a
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Given these constraints, there is little that shareholders can do to
affirmatively prevent corporate insiders from spending money on
political activities that are not in the interests of shareholders. Corporate
law leaves them with one other recourse: a derivative suit challenging a
specific expenditure or program of activity that is allegedly harmful to
the corporation. The premise of a derivative suit is that the corporation
has been harmed by someone, but its management will not take action
against that person-in a prototypical case, because the wrongdoer
herself controls the corporation. In this situation, a shareholder can
attempt to file suit on behalf of the corporation, with the goal of
securing a recovery for the corporation. The corporation's underlying
claim is that its directors or officers, in authorizing the challenged
political activity, have violated one or more of their fiduciary duties to
shareholders, and therefore should be liable for the harm they have
caused to the corporation.
The fiduciary duties of corporate insiders, and the ability of
derivative suits to enforce them, have been cited as a possible constraint
on corporate political activity. One argument is that the existence of
fiduciary duties and derivative suits is sufficient to close the subject:
fiduciary duties ensure alignment between corporate policies and
shareholders' interests, and if insiders violate those duties, they will be
punished by derivative suits. 59 Another set of commentators recognizes
that fiduciary duties should create that alignment, but in practice are
difficult to enforce. Brudney doubts that either shareholder voting or
derivative suits could significantly affect political activities undertaken
by management. 60 Fisch warns against relying on fiduciary duties: "an
ample body of scholarship takes the position that stockholders' tools for
disciplining their agents are, in large part, ineffective." 61 More recently,
in the wake of Citizens United, Elizabeth F.R. Gingerich, William Alan
Nelson II, and Jonathan Romiti have separately highlighted shareholder
derivative suits as a possible mechanism for reining in corporate
political spending. 62
shareholder proposal that is "not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws
of the jurisdiction of the company's organization." Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8(i)(1) (2013).
59. See, e.g., Yosifon, supra note 39, at 1228.
60. Brudney, supra note 36, at 257-58.
61. Fisch, supranote 55, at 638.
62. Elizabeth F.R. Gingerich, Shareholder Value Diminution and Tools of Redress:
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Today, derivative suits claiming a breach of fiduciary duty face
a difficult uphill battle, primarily because of the importance of the
business judgment rule in fending off challenges to insiders' decisions. I
argue below, however, that courts should look more closely at corporate
political activity, requiring corporations to provide a reasonable
justification for political expenditures that are challenged by
shareholders. With this heightened scrutiny, derivative suits to enforce
fiduciary duties could become an effective tool to align political
spending with shareholder interests.
III. CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT
Corporations certainly have the power to engage in political
activity through the various means described above. 63 The fact that a
corporation has the power to do something, however, does not mean
that its directors and managers may always do that thing with impunity.
For example, corporations have the power to purchase property, 64 but
that does mean that a board of directors can cause a corporation to buy
property from one of its members at a grossly inflated price without
incurring liability. At a minimum, directors and officers must observe a
set of core fiduciary duties including the duty of care, the duty of
loyalty, and the obligation of good faith.65 In general terms, these
Uncertainty in a Post-Citizen United Era, 12 J. ACCT. FIN. 71, 78-80 (2012); William Alan
Nelson II, Post-Citizens United: Using ShareholderDerivative Claims of Corporate Waste
to Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13 NEV. L.J. 134, 155-67
(2012); Jonathan Romiti, Note, Playing Politics with Shareholder Value: The Case for
Applying FiduciaryLaw to CorporatePoliticalDonations Post-Citizens United, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 737, 769-73 (2012). Gingerich seems skeptical of the likelihood of success of a
derivative suit, considering the importance of the business judgment rule. Romiti, by
contrast, seems somewhat optimistic that a shareholder's waste or duty of loyalty claims
would prevail. Nelson lists various arguments that shareholders could make in support of
their claims. While I am in broad agreement with Nelson and Romiti, I argue in this paper
that success will depend on a more fundamental analysis of the business judgment rule and
its applicability to corporate political activity.
63. Unless constrained by some other law, a corporation typically has the power to do
anything necessary for the promotion of its business or other purpose. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
TIT. 8, § 121 (West2013).
64.

E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8,

§

122(4) (West 2013).

65. The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that the obligation of good faith is
technically a subset of the duty of loyalty. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter,
911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). It's not clear that this distinction makes a difference, since a
failure to act in good faith can result in liability either way. Id. ("[A] failure to act in good
faith may [result in liability], but indirectly.. . . [T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty ...
encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.").
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require, respectively, that insiders take reasonable care in their actions,
avoid making individual profits at the corporation's expense, and take
their duties seriously.
If directors or officers breach these duties, shareholders can sue
them seeking damages or other remedies. 66 Suits to enforce fiduciary
duties can take virtually any form, limited only by the plaintiffs
imagination. One prominent category is suits alleging that directors
harmed the corporation by paying excessive compensation to executives
or to themselves. 67 Another important class of shareholder suits is those
claiming that a corporation's directors did not adequately protect
shareholders' interests when agreeing to a merger or an acquisition by
another company. 68 In both of these contexts, the underlying concern is
that directors may be motivated by concerns other than maximizing
shareholder value: in the former, doing a favor to the CEO who
nominated them to the board and with whom they work regularly; in the
latter, keeping control of the corporation so that they can keep their jobs
or avoid embarrassment.
Running a corporation can be complicated, however, and it is
widely believed that directors and managers should not have to face
constant second-guessing by shareholders and judges, particularly if
their decisions turn out badly through no fault of their own. This
sentiment underlies the business judgment rule, which is corporate
insiders' first and most important line of protection against liability for
their actions. This rule states that directors and officers fulfill their duty
of care by "mak[ing] a business judgment in good faith," so long as they
are not personally interested in the judgment, are well informed in
making that judgment, and rationally believe it to be in the best interests
of the corporation. 69 A plaintiff who seeks to hold directors or officers
66. This suit may be either a direct or a derivative suit, depending on the nature of the
harm suffered by shareholders. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Del. 1996). A
suit challenging political activity authorized by directors or officers would be a derivative
suit, since a direct suit would have to allege "an injury which is separate and distinct from
that suffered by other shareholders, ... or a wrong involving a contractual right of a
shareholder." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d
1059, 1070 (Del. Ch. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. E.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006);
68. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
69.

AM.

LAW

INST.,

PRINCIPLES

OF

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (1994). The business judgment rule is a product of common law,
not of statute, so it has no statutory formulation.
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liable for an action that allegedly has harmed the corporation must rebut
the presumption created by the business judgment rule by proving that
the defendants did not act in good faith, had a conflict of interest, did
not properly inform themselves, or could not possibly have believed that
the action in question was good for the corporation.
There are several justifications for the business judgment rule.
One is the need for directors and officers to take risks, which may
ultimately turn out badly for their company. It is conventional wisdom
that superior financial returns cannot be earned without taking on risk;
that people and institutions invest in stocks because they want to receive
higher returns than are available from near-risk-free investments such as
Treasury securities; and that some degree of corporate risk-taking is
essential to a productive economy and overall prosperity. For these
reasons, directors and managers should take risks, such as developing
new products and entering new markets, that have a significant chance
of losing money. In the words of Bayless Manning,
From a social standpoint, innovation and risk-taking are
exactly what boards of directors of most companies ...
should be encouraged to pursue. Precisely because many
of the innovative projects proposed by the board will
inevitably fail, the business judgment rule is most
needed to protect directors from liability. 70
Without the business judgment rule, corporations would
underinvest in risky ventures, and society as a whole would suffer.
A second common argument for the business judgment rule is
that courts are poorly placed to evaluate business decisions, for at least
two reasons. One is that judicial review of corporate action inevitably
occurs after the fact and with the benefit of hindsight. As the Second
Circuit stated in Joy v. North,

[A]fter-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to
evaluate
corporate
business
decisions.
The
circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not
70. Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45 OHIo ST L.J. 615,
622 (1984). Note that Manning was summarizing a particular point of view and not
necessarily endorsing it as his own.
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easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since
business imperatives often call for quick decisions,
inevitably based on less than perfect information. The
entrepreneur's function is to encounter risks and to
confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time
made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against
a background of perfect knowledge.7 1
The other reason is that judges do not typically have experience
making business decisions and would be more likely to make bad
decisions than would experienced executives. Therefore, allowing
substantive, after-the-fact judicial review of business decisions would
require managers to guess at what a judge might do in their place,
lowering the quality of those decisions. As Judge Richard Posner of the
Seventh Circuit put it, "Not only do businessmen know more about
business than judges do, but competition in the product and labor
markets and in the market for corporate control provides sufficient
punishment for businessmen who commit more than their share of
business mistakes." 72 Posner's conclusion is that the free market
provides better oversight of directors and officers than the courts could
provide.
A third frequent justification is that, without the business
judgment rule, people would be reluctant to serve as directors of public
corporations. On this view, as summarized by Manning,
[T]he key problem at hand is how to attract, hold, and
motivate directors of outstanding capacity to devote
their time and attention to the interests of the
corporation.... [I]f a director is personally honest, has
no interest conflict, and (within the restricted limits of
the time and attention which can be allocated to the
corporation) has paid attention to corporate activities,
then the director should be able to sleep at night without
worrying about being pilloried by a plaintiffs lawyer or
being subjected to the risk of personal liability after
71.
72.

692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982).
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd

481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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being second-guessed on a business matter years after
the fact ... .

The business judgment rule, therefore, is necessary to ensure
that qualified people will be willing to assume director positions, which
is ultimately good both for shareholders and for society at large.
If the business judgment rule applies to a particular decision,
courts will be highly deferential to the corporate directors or officers
who made that decision. There are a few principal avenues that
plaintiffs can pursue in seeking to overcome the business judgment rule.
One is to allege that insiders were conflicted because they had a
personal stake in the decision. 74 In that case the business judgment rule
does not apply, and the court will subject the decision to a higher degree
of scrutiny. 75 Another is to claim that the insiders did not sufficiently
inform themselves when making the decision. 76 If they did not make a
considered business judgment, then they should not enjoy the protection
of the business judgment rule, and could be held liable for harm that
they cause to the corporation as a result. Finally, even if insiders are not
conflicted and have sufficiently informed themselves before making a
decision, a plaintiff can attempt to claim "waste" of corporate assets.
The standard for demonstrating waste is extremely high, however: a
challenged transaction must be "so one sided that no business person of
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has
73. Manning, supra note 70, at 627.
74. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("[The business judgment rule's]
protections can only be claimed by disinterested directors whose conduct otherwise meets
the tests of business judgment. From the standpoint of interest, this means that directors can
neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial
benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the
corporation or all stockholders generally.").
75. The degree of scrutiny can depend on the nature of the conflict. The simplest case
is that a transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors or officers must
meet the standard of "entire fairness"-that is, it must be substantively fair to the
corporation-unless it is ratified either by the directors who do not have an interest in the
transaction or by the shareholders. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2013). Board
ratification may be by a majority of either the disinterested board members or the
disinterested members of the committee authorizing the transaction. Id. § 144(a).
76. Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("Under the business
judgment rule there is no protection for directors who have made 'an unintelligent or
unadvised judgment."' (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, 167 A. 831, 833
(1933))); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(ii) (2010) (eliminating liability
unless, inter alia,a director "was not informed to an extent the director reasonably believed
appropriate in the circumstances").
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received adequate consideration."n In summary, corporate law has
evolved significant barriers that stand in the way of a plaintiff seeking
to challenge a business decision made by a corporation's directors or
officers.
IV. CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY

One obvious issue in election law, as applied to corporations, is
that corporations are associations of stakeholders (shareholders,
managers, employees, etc.) who usually have differing political
preferences and opinions. According to the Supreme Court, this is
simply a matter of corporate law, to be resolved using the usual tools
and principles of corporate law. In First National Bank of Boston v.

Bellotti, a fundamental case affirming the right of corporations to
engage in politics, the Court held:
Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of
corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate
on public issues. Acting through their power to elect the board of
directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the corporation's
charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their
own interests. In addition to intracorporate remedies, minority
shareholders generally have access to the judicial remedy of a derivative
suit to challenge corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for
improper corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests
of management. 7
The central question, then, is what constraints the fiduciary
duties of directors and officers, as enforced through shareholder
derivative suits, place on corporate political activity.
The decision to spend money on political communications or to
contribute money to an organization such as a super PAC or the
Chamber of Commerce, whether approved by the board of directors or
77. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)).
Technically speaking, a successful waste claim does not render the business judgment rule
inapplicable; the business judgment rule applies, but the insiders are held liable anyway
because their decision was so egregious. Id. ("This onerous standard for waste is a corollary
of the proposition that where business judgment presumptions are applicable, the board's
decision will be upheld unless it cannot be 'attributed to any rational business purpose."'
(quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971))).

78. 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978).
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delegated by the board to managers, may seem like an ordinary business
decision that is protected by the business judgment rule. After all, in
concept the corporation is spending money for which it expects to
receive some benefit in the form of favorable public policies or
favorable treatment by elected officials.
However, shareholders may be able to rebut the business
judgment rule presumption on the grounds that the directors or officers
authorizing a contribution failed to properly inform themselves
regarding its merits; if this claim is successful, the insiders could then
be held liable for losses suffered by the corporation. Alternatively,
shareholders can argue that the directors or officers were affected by a
conflict of interest; because political activity presents a significant risk
of conflict, courts should apply a higher degree of scrutiny to political
expenditures. If either approach is successful, the result will be that
insiders will have to show a reasonable basis for believing that such
expenditures will provide a net benefit to the corporation. 79
A.

Failure To Make an Informed Decision

In many situations, a plaintiff shareholder could argue that
corporate insiders do not merit the protection of the business judgment
rule because they failed to make an informed decision regarding a
political expenditure. An informed board decision requires that "the
directors have informed themselves 'prior to making a business
decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.' 80
79. If the plaintiff cannot avoid the business judgment rule, she would have to claim
waste, which requires that she show that no reasonable person would have made the
contribution in question. While there are hypothetical fact patterns that would warrant a
finding of waste (e.g., a regulated utility in California bankrolls a super PAC whose sole
purpose is to elect a candidate for dogcatcher in a small town in Maine), the vast majority of
corporate political contributions will not fall into this category. Nelson argues that political
donations to losing causes constitute waste, since the corporation receives nothing for its
expenditure. Nelson, supra note62, at 159. By the same token, however, an investment in a
research and development project that fails to produce a commercially viable project would
constitute waste; the appropriate moment at which to consider whether an investment might
have been considered reasonable is the time when the investment is made, not after its
returns are known.
80. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) ("The members
of the board of directors or a committee of the board, when becoming informed in
connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight
function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would
reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.").
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In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
a corporation's directors were liable for failing to properly inform
themselves about whether an acquisition offer was at a sufficiently high
price. In a corporate political activity case, the analogous claim would
be that the directors failed to inform themselves about whether a
proposed contribution would provide sufficient benefits to the
corporation. 82 The basic principle is that a court should trust a (nonconflicted) board's decision regarding whether a political donation will
provide net benefits to the corporation-but only if the directors
actually gather the information necessary to make that decision. The
plaintiff shareholder could argue that, before signing off on a political
investment, the board should demand information similar to that
required before authorizing a capital investment: at a minimum, there
should be some basis on which to calculate expected returns from the
investment, as well as some analysis of alternative political investments.
Defendants are likely to argue that they had all the information
they needed. For example, a contribution to the Chamber of Commerce
might be defended on the grounds that the Chamber is the largest
lobbying and advocacy group for American businesses; News Corp.'s
contribution to the Republican Governors Association might be
defended on the grounds that it is conventional wisdom that
Republicans are better for corporations than Democrats. Neither of
these justifications would pass muster, however, if a board were
considering a takeover bid or a capital investment. In those cases, a
board that didn't consider some form of quantitative analysis would
almost certainly be held liable for making an uninformed decision. 83
81. 488 A.2d at 874.
82. The discussion here focuses on the substantive issue of what degree of
investigation is required to fulfill the duty of care. There is a separate procedural issue that
will come into play in an actual derivative suit: in order to overcome the requirement of presuit demand on the board, the plaintiff is required to "allege with particularity" that, in this
example, the challenged donation was "not the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment." Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996). In practice, it could be
difficult to allege with particularity that the board did not properly inform itself prior to
making a donation, since this would require a specific allegation regarding the nonexistence of an investigation. The procedural barriers to derivative suits are a topic outside
the scope of this paper. For now, I simply note that if insiders can violate their fiduciary
duty of care, but can still win motions to dismiss because plaintiffs cannot find evidence of
those violations, that is another argument for changing the procedural rules governing
derivative suits.
83. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the board approved an offer at $55 per share while their
company's stock was trading at $38 per share, a forty-five percent premium, yet was held

2013]

CORPORATE LA W CONSTRANTS

273

Since cash is cash, whether it is being spent on a new factory or donated
to a social welfare organization, courts should require that insiders have
some quantitative basis for believing that a political expenditure is
likely to provide a net benefit to the corporation. 84
Without that basis, a decision to donate money to a particular
political organization is not sufficiently informed, which constitutes a
violation of the duty of care.8 5 This breach "rebuts the presumption that
the directors have acted in the best interests of the shareholders, and
requires the directors to prove that the transaction was entirely fair."86
This should be a difficult task for the defendant insiders, especially for
contributions to organizations that pursue a broad political agenda.87 It
may be reasonable to believe, for example, that a donation to the
Chamber of Commerce will reduce the likelihood of more onerous
financial regulation, which will reduce compliance costs and protect
profit margins for financial institutions. But is this particular political
investment worth the cost?
First, there is the basic question of whether the organization in
question is one that uses resources efficiently. In ordinary business
operations, even if a general course of action is in the best interests of
the corporation (say, buying a small competitor), a responsible
executive would still ask whether the specific action taken (say, the
particular competitor being bought) is a good use of money. Second, as
a theoretical matter, voluntary contributions raise free-rider concerns. If
one large bank donates money to the Chamber for use in an advertising
campaign, even if that campaign produces positive returns, those returns
will be shared by all of the bank's competitors; it is no longer clear that
the donation would provide a net benefit to the donating corporation.
liable for not adequately assessing the adequacy of the acquisition price. 488 A.2d. at 875.
84. In an analogous context, there is also considerable evidence that acquisitions of
other companies are not, in aggregate, a good use of corporate funds. A particular
acquisition-even one that turns out badly in retrospect-will not create insider liability if
the directors informed themselves sufficiently and considered the decision carefully; but
buying another company on a whim, simply on the belief that acquisitions in general are
good, could create such liability.
85. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993).
86. Id.
87. It is easier to prove the fairness of a contribution to an organization that focuses on
a specific issue in which the corporation clearly has an interest. See Marsili v. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding a contribution to an
association campaigning against a ballot referendum that would have increased the
corporation's taxes and interfered with its building plans).
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Third, as discussed above, there is considerable empirical evidence that
political expenditures are not a good use of corporate funds in generalmaking it less likely that any particular donation is a good idea. For
these reasons, it should be difficult for defendant insiders to prove the
fairness of a political contribution that is not earmarked for a particular
issue of interest to the contribution.
In the end, a court could find directors liable for authorizing a
political expenditure without a sufficient basis for believing it to be in
the best interests of the corporation.88 One complication is that many
political donations are unlikely to be board-level issues, simply because
the dollar amounts involved are too small, and therefore directors would
not have an obligation to inform themselves regarding specific
expenditures. Still, officers have fiduciary duties too, and "the fiduciary
duties of officers are the same as those of directors," 8 9 so corporate
political activities authorized by corporate executives also must be made
on a sufficiently informed basis. 90
What would be the result of a decision assigning liability to
corporate insiders for a political contribution? Some corporations might
simply stop making political donations, except for those dedicated to
specific issues that clearly affect the company's bottom line. Others will
continue making contributions to the general funds of multiple-issue
organizations like the Chamber of Commerce, but they will sensibly
want to avoid the burden of having to prove in court that those
contributions were fair to the corporation at the time they were made. In
order to recover the protection of the business judgment rule, their
directors and officers will make sure they are properly informing
themselves. Most likely they will establish internal processes to
determine whether specific contributions are good uses of corporate
88. On the other hand, courts may resolve these uncertainties in favor of defendants.
Arguably, since a corporation would have received nothing concrete in exchange for a
proper political donation (one made on the basis of sufficient information), the fact that it
received nothing concrete in exchange for an improper donation cannot be said to be unfair.
89. Gantlerv. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009).
90. Alternatively, a plaintiff might allege a breach of directors' oversight duties. In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). This would be a very
long shot, however, since those oversight duties only extend to assuring the existence of
information and reporting systems necessary "to reach informed judgments concerning both
the corporation's compliance with law and its business performance," id at 970, and
liability will only arise if directors "utterly fail[] to implement any reporting or information
system or controls; or ... consciously fail[] to monitor or oversee its operations," Stone ex
rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
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funds according to objective criteria, such as estimates of the benefits
that would flow from given policy changes and estimates of the
likelihood that those contributions could secure those changes. These
processes and the evidence they generate would show that the
corporation's directors and officers reasonably believed, on an informed
basis, that their contributions were beneficial to the corporation.
Once these processes are in place, the corporation's political
expenditures will be protected by the business judgment rule and will
not have to meet the test of entire fairness, meaning that directors and
officers will be generally immune from liability. The net effect,
however, would be to tie corporate political activity more closely to the
interests of shareholders, since contributions would not be made without
some evidence that they actually provide economic benefits for the
corporation.
B.

Conflict ofInterest

1. The Potential for Conflict
Contributions to political organizations create a significant
potential for conflicts of interest. In order to benefit from the business
judgment rule, the Delaware Supreme Court stated in Aronson v. Lewis,
"directors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to
derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing,
as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all
stockholders generally." 9 1 As many commentators have noted,
executives or directors may use corporate political contributions to
further their personal interests or preferences rather than the needs of
the corporation and its shareholders 92-precisely the problem noted in
91. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
92. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 50, at 942 ("[C]orporate political
spending may reflect not only directors' and executives' business judgment, but also their
political preferences."); Coates, supra note 48, at 664 ("A number of studies present
evidence that CPA represents a form of managerial 'consumption' good-consistent with
the possibility that it is pursued at the expense of shareholders."); Brudney, supra note 36, at
258 ("[M]anagement is substantially free to use corporate assets to urge any political or
social views it sees fit."); Ansolabehere et al., supra note 41, at 127 ("Organizations'
executives and managers may value being part of the Washington establishment."); Romiti,
supra note 62, at 771-72 ("[W]hen officers or directors exploit their positions of power to
further their own political or personal interests, this should be a plain violation of their
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the empirical studies discussed above. A CEO may choose to donate to
an organization because it will advocate for policies that benefit her as
an individual, or because doing so will enhance her own political
career. 93 In fact, this is precisely what many investors believe is going
on: in a 2006 survey, seventy-three percent of shareholders agreed with
the statement that "Corporate political spending is often undertaken to
advance the private political interests of corporate executives rather than
the interest of the company and its shareholders." 94 Of course, multiple
motivations may be at work in a given contribution. For example,
conservative organizations such as Americans for Prosperity and
American Crossroads tend to support deregulatory policies that should
benefit at least some corporations; at the same time, they support lower
individual income taxes on high-income households, which should
benefit many corporate directors and executives.
To put this in perspective, in the 2012 elections, Republican
nominee Mitt Romney and many Republican candidates campaigned on
a platform of making all of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent and
repealing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010,95
which increased Medicare taxes on high-income households. The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce supported both positions. 96 Compared with
President Obama's proposal to let the tax cuts expire for the rich (and
not repeal the Affordable Care Act), the Republicans' tax policies were
worth about $600,000 per year for a CEO with an annual income of
$9.6 million-the median total compensation in 2011 of CEOs of
companies in the S&P 500 index. 97 Since most directors of large public
fiduciary obligations to a corporation's shareholders.").
93. For example, CEOs of firms that engaged in lobbying were significantly more
likely to pursue later political careers than CEOs of other firms. Coates, supra note 48, at
679.
94.

SURVEY

CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY,

OF

AMERICAN

SHAREHOLDERS

CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING:

9

(2006),

available

A

at

http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/918.
95. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). For procedural reasons, the health care reform legislation of
2010 also included the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
96. Key Vote Alert on S. 3412, the "Middle Class Tax Cut Act," U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE (July 25, 2012), http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2012/key-vote-alert-s3412-middle-class-tax-cut-act; Key Vote Letter on H.R. 6079, the "Repeal of Obamacare
Act",

U.S.

CHAMBER

OF

COMMERCE

(July

10,

2012),

http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/key-vote-letter-hr-6079-repeal-obamacare-act.
97. Bernard Condon, Typical CEO Made $9.6M Last Year, AP Study Finds,
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companies are well off (and many are CEOs of public companies
themselves), lower individual income taxes on the wealthy are in their
financial interests as well. Corporate donations that increase the chances
of securing low individual income tax rates, therefore, provide a
"personal financial benefit" to many of the people responsible for those
donations.
Potential conflicts of interest are not limited to the case of rich
corporate insiders seeking to lower their own taxes. One reason the
NYSCRF chose to sue Qualcomm for access to its books and records
seems to be that Irwin Jacobs, the company's co-founder, the former
chair of its board, and the father of its current CEO and board chair, is
himself a major Democratic Party supporter who contributed over $2
million to Democratic-leaning super PACs in the 2012 election cycle. 98
The suspicion is that, if a corporate insider is willing to give large
amounts of her personal fortune to support certain political causes, she
might be even more willing to cause the corporation to support those
same causes-since she can get the same political benefits at lower cost
to herself. A corporate executive might also make political contributions
in order to bolster her own personal network, or simply to do favors for
people in that network. In 2010, the media conglomerate News Corp.
gave $1 million to the Republican Governors Association-according to
New Corp. CEO Rupert Murdoch, because of his personal friendship
with Ohio gubernatorial candidate John Kasich. 99
2. Judicial Evaluation
In order to rebut the business judgment rule presumption, a
plaintiff shareholder needs to show that one or more insiders who
decided on a political contribution stood to gain some personal benefit

ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 25, 2012, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/typical-ceo-

made-9-6m-100244495.html. Together, the differences between Republican and Democratic
tax policies amounted to about 9.8 percentage points of tax on investment income and 5.5
percentage points of tax on ordinary income. According to the AP study cited above, the
median S&P 500 CEO made $1.7 million in stock options and $7.9 million in other
compensation, including stock awards.
98. Nicholas Confessore, State Comptroller Sues Qualcomm for Data About Its
PoliticalContributions,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, at A18.
99. Keach Hagey, Kasich Inspired News Corp.'s RGA Gift, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2010),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/onmedia/1010/Kasichinspired NewsCorpsRGA gift.htm
1.
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from that contribution. Showing some degree of interest should be
possible in many cases. For example, the same U.S. Chamber of
Commerce that ran ads attacking the proposed CFPA also stated, as a
policy priority for 2012, "Preserve current marginal individual tax rates
and reduced tax rates on capital gains and dividend income."o So a
financial institution's contribution to the Chamber, while arguably
advancing the corporation's interest in limiting regulation of its
activities, also advanced its directors' and executives' interest in lower
personal taxes.
The more complicated question is what to do about this conflict
of interest. On the one hand, the existence of a conflict should render
the business judgment rule inapplicable. On the other hand, this type of
conflict-where an insider receives an ancillary benefit from a
transaction, but is not actually on both sides of the negotiating table, and
the ancillary benefit seems to come at no cost to the corporation'o'
probably does not constitute a fully-fledged breach of the duty of
loyalty under existing case law. In the language of Aronson, the insider
derives a "personal financial benefit," but making the case that there is
"self-dealing" is more difficult. The insider could also argue that any
"benefit" she receives-lower income tax rates, for example, or any
other public policy that she prefers-is enjoyed by all shareholders in
the sense that the law applies to all people equally (even though
different people are affected differently by specific provisions of the
law). The usual approach taken by the courts where there is a conflict of
interest-holding a transaction to the standard of entire fairness102-has
typically been applied in cases where the insider was virtually on both
sides of the negotiating table or in takeover cases, not in cases of an
ancillary personal benefit that is difficult to quantify.
100. Capital Markets, Corporate Governance, and Securities Regulation, U.S.
CHAMBER

OF

COMMERCE,

http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/media/2012PolicyPriorities.pdf (last visited
Nov. 7, 2013).
101. Arguably there is a cost to the corporation, since some proportion of the funds
donated to the Chamber (in this example) are going to advocate for lower individual income
taxes, not for policies that will directly benefit the corporation. But this is more subtle than
the typical duty of loyalty case.
102. Boyer v. Wilmington Materials, Inc., 754 A.2d 881, 898 (1999) ("It is a wellsettled principle of Delaware law that where directors stand on both sides of a transaction,
they have 'the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful
scrutiny by the courts."' (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del.
1983))).
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For these reasons, it is currently unclear how a court should
evaluate a political contribution that arguably provides some benefit to
the corporation but also provides individual benefits to insiders. If there
is direct evidence that a political contribution was specifically motivated
by a director's or an officer's self-interest, a court should subject the
contribution to the entire fairness standard. More often, however, if
there is some area in which the recipient organization's efforts intersect
with the corporation's interests, the court may be tempted to ignore the
fact that insiders benefit personally from other policies supported by
that organization.
3. Heightened Scrutiny
From a legal standpoint, this is an uncomfortable situation. We
know there is a good chance that corporate insiders may be using their
position to direct funds toward organizations that further their interests
as individuals, and empirical evidence suggests that this is probably
happening, yet existing corporate law does not clearly indicate how this
conflict of interest should be addressed. In this subsection, I argue that,
because of the widespread potential for and likelihood of conflict, courts
should adopt a regime of heightened scrutiny for political activities by
corporations.
The first question is whether the business judgment rule should
apply in its ordinary form-no liability absent a failure to inform, a
clear financial conflict, or waste-should apply to political donations in
the first place. The business judgment rule exists for valid policy
reasons discussed above: to free corporate leaders to take risks, to
constrain judicial second-guessing, and to attract people to serve as
corporate directors. However, these concerns apply only tangentially, if
at all, to the issue of corporate contributions to political organizations.
First, it seems unlikely that allowing closer scrutiny of such
contributions would cause overall corporate risk-taking to fall below its
socially optimal level. Money spent to influence elections and policy
outcomes is not money spent on developing new technologies or
expanding manufacturing capacity. Given that the total supply of
electoral winners and of policy decisions is independent of the amount
of money expended on them, we cannot say that our society as a whole
underinvests in politics. To the extent that politics is a zero-sum game,
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underinvestment by corporations does not harm society as a whole. To
the extent that higher investment could produce better policies (for
example, by bringing more information into the political process), we
might worry if corporations were underrepresented relative to other
interest groups. If this were true, however, corporations could still spend
their own money on lobbying and public relations efforts intended to
influence elected officials directly or to encourage shareholders to
support their preferred positions. We should also remember that
corporations do not themselves have political preferences; any political
opinion that a corporation might express must also be held by some
individuals, who could use their own resources to bring that opinion
into the marketplace of ideas.103
The second justification is concerned with business decisions
that have concrete, visible outcomes: products that never reach the
market, merger synergies that never materialize, capital investments that
cost far more than predicted, and so on. The fear is that judges will be
influenced by these negative outcomes to believe that the underlying
decisions were unreasonable at the time they were made. Again, this
fear seems inappropriate to political donations. The potential negative
outcome is that the corporation contributes money to an organization
that conducts a political campaign that fails. For example, despite the
efforts of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Congress did create the
CFPB in the Dodd-Frank Act. In this case, unlike for an acquisition that
goes awry, it is extremely difficult to draw a causal connection between
the corporation's decision to contribute money and the eventual
outcome. It would make little sense for a plaintiff to argue that a
contribution to a losing campaign was a bad decision, since the same
could be said of a contribution to a winning campaign: in most cases,
given the number of contributors and the number of political actors
involved, the outcome cannot be said to turn on any corporation's
individual action. The corporation's obvious lack of control over the
outcome is what makes it difficult to use a negative outcome as
evidence of a poor decision in the first place.
Finally, if political contributions were not protected by the
business judgment rule, the most likely result would not be to deter
people from serving as corporate directors. Instead, it is far more likely

103.

1 defer First Amendment considerations until Part VI. Infra Part VI.
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that many boards would reduce the amount of such contributions, and
the remainder would pay much more attention to the subject. The
business judgment rule would still apply to the large majority of issues
faced by boards of directors. The fact that the rule does not apply in its
simple form in other specific contexts, such as insider compensation and
takeover defenses, has not made it impossible for corporations to fill
their boards. Instead, it has caused directors to pay more attention to
insider compensation and takeover defenses, which is a good thing.
Carving out political spending from the scope of the rule would have a
similar, limited impact on boards.
For these reasons, there is no social imperative dictating that the
simple business judgment rule should apply to all corporate political
activity. The widespread possibility that insiders are using political
donations to further their personal interests, in ways that are not easily
constrained by the duty of loyalty, implies that we should consider
alternatives to the rule. But if we dispense with the business judgment
rule for political contributions, what should replace it? Subjecting every
single donation to the entire fairness standard would probably go too
far, essentially eliminating corporate political activity (and raising First
Amendment concerns).
The law of mergers and acquisitions provides a useful example
of a possible alternative. Like political expenditures, sales of
corporations present a significant risk of a conflict of interest that may
be difficult to prove in a particular case. The risk is that directors
(including, but not limited to, executives) may attempt to fight off a
takeover in order to preserve their current positions, or favor one
transaction over another because of its impact on their personal
financial or career interests. For these reasons, Delaware courts do not
apply the business judgment rule in its simple form to corporate changes
of control, and have instead created their own legal standards. 1 04 These
standards are applied prior to the business judgment rule, even in the
absence of concrete evidence that a board is motivated by entrenchment:
"Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protections of the business
104. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985),
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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judgment rule may be conferred." 05 In this context, any defenses must
be based on a reasonable belief that the takeover attempt constitutes a
threat to the corporation or its shareholders;1 06 the defenses must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed;1 07 and, once a breakup or
change of control becomes inevitable, they may not favor one bidder at
the expense of another.' 0 8 Only if these conditions are met does the
business judgment rule apply. 109
Similarly, the courts have the opportunity to create a new
standard for evaluating challenges to corporate political contributionsanother area in which the "omnipresent specter" of conflict warrants
particular scrutiny. In similar contexts, they have shown considerable
creativity in devising such standards.' 10 The test for political donations
should be similar to that used in change-of-control situations. Courts
should require defendant insiders to prove that they had "reasonable
grounds for believing" that the contribution in question would provide a
net benefit to the corporation, "a burden satisfied by a showing of good
faith and reasonable investigation."' This is an appropriate standard of
evaluation because it embodies the requirement that political activities
should provide net benefits to the corporation on an expected basis-an
application of the general principle that corporate actions should create
economic value and benefit shareholders. By focusing on the
knowledge and beliefs of insiders at the time of the contribution, the
proposed standard acknowledges the fact that many particular
donations, considered after the fact, will not turn out to have provided
105. Unocal,493 A.2d at 954.
106. Id. at 955.
107. Id.
108. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
109. Id. at 180 ("While the business judgment rule may be applicable to the actions of
corporate directors responding to takeover threats, the principles upon which it is foundedcare, loyalty and independence-must first be satisfied.").
110. For another example of how courts have dealt with situations where there is a
threat but not the certainty of a conflict of interest, consider the Delaware Supreme Court's
treatment of cases where a board's special litigation committee recommends dismissal of a
shareholder derivative action: first the corporation must prove independence, good faith, and
reasonable investigation on the part of the committee; then, even if that hurdle is cleared, the
court should use "its own independent business judgment" to decide whether or not to
dismiss the suit. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981).
111. This proposal adapts the language used of Revlon: "This potential for conflict
places upon the directors the burden of proving that they had reasonable grounds for
believing there was a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness, a burden satisfied by a
showing of good faith and reasonable investigation." 506 A.2d at 180.
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net benefits (and, in any case, it is extremely difficult to estimate those
net benefits). But by requiring reasonable grounds for that belief based
on a reasonable investigation, the standard does not allow insiders to
direct corporate funds to their preferred organizations on the basis of
hopeful guesses or conclusory assertions regarding corporate benefits.
In practical terms, the effect of this standard on corporate
behavior would probably be similar to that produced by court decisions
assigning liability to insiders for failure to inform themselves regarding
political contributions, discussed above. In court, defendant directors or
officers could be required to show that they believed their contributions
would be beneficial to the corporation, and that that belief was based on
a reasonable investigation. To protect themselves against this
possibility, they would either scale back their program of political
spending or subject it to considerably more scrutiny, creating internal
procedures to ensure that each contribution was supported by a
quantitative analysis showing a plausible likelihood of delivering a net
benefit to the corporation. This would help align political activities with
the interests of shareholders rather than the personal preferences of
directors and officers.
Another possibility is that the board could choose to submit
political contributions for shareholder approval. In a typical transaction
between a corporation and an insider, as long as the details of the
transaction are disclosed, along with any potential conflicts of interest,
shareholder ratification has the effect of restoring the protection of the
business judgment rule.11 2 Since the underlying reason for heightened
scrutiny of political expenditures is the threat of conflict of interest,
shareholder ratification should have the same effect here. (The board's
duty to properly inform itself before submitting a program of political
contributions to shareholders would still apply, since the shareholders
must themselves be fully informed.)
In any case, this heightened standard for judicial evaluation of
political activities would help ensure that corporations' political
spending is more closely focused on initiatives that have a good chance
of promoting shareholder value and make it harder for executives to
direct contributions based on their personal financial interests or
ideological preferences. By requiring corporations to investigate and
112.

DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (West 2013); In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc.

S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995).
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substantiate the merits of their political activities, it would also make it
possible for shareholders to come to an informed judgment about the
relevance and value of those activities. This would help make the
Supreme Court's assumption in Bellotti-that "shareholders may
decide ... whether their corporation should engage in debate on public
issues" 13 -a reality.
V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHARITABLE
AND SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS

The argument above seeks to ensure that corporate political
activity actually serves the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, rather than the personal interests of well-placed insiders,
by applying common principles of corporate law. From a governance
perspective, contributions to politically oriented charitable organizations
present the same problems as political spending in general: they
represent an opportunity for insiders to use the corporation's money to
pursue their financial interests, support their ideological preferences, or
advance their future political careers. Contributions to politically
oriented 501(c)(3) charitable organizations pose a particular problem,
however, which may also apply to contributions to 501(c)(4) social
welfare organizations. Corporate law currently grants to charitable
contributions an additional layer of protection from shareholder
challenge, essentially allowing any gift to a qualifying organization that
is reasonable in amount.
A.

CorporateLaw and CharitableContributions

Historically, it was legally unclear whether corporations had the
power to make charitable contributions. Modern statutes, however, have
uniformly granted this power to corporations.l 14 These statutes come in
two general forms. One provides a general authorization to make
contributions for the public good. In Delaware, for example,
corporations may "[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for

113. First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978).
114. See Stevelman Kahn, supra note 33, at 594-609; R. Franklin Balotti & James J.
Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable Contributions by
Corporations,54 Bus. LAW 965, 970-73 (1999).
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charitable, scientific or educational purposes.""' 5 The other specifies
that such contributions need not provide any benefit to the corporation.
New York, for example, allows corporations to "make donations,
irrespective of corporate benefit, for the public welfare or for
community fund, hospital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic or
similar purposes."I1 6 The distinction is potentially significant: the New
York statute explicitly allows for charitable contributions that do not
benefit the corporation, while the Delaware statute only confers a
specific power that, one might argue, should only be used to benefit the
corporation and its shareholders. After all, the same section of the
Delaware Corporate Law also gives corporations the power to buy and
sell property, 117 but directors and officers must observe their fiduciary
duties in authorizing any such transactions.
In practice, judicial interpretation of these statutes, at least in
Delaware, has largely written traditional corporate governance concerns
out of the law. In Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, the Delaware

Chancery Court held that "the Delaware statute ... must ... be
construed to authorize any reasonable corporate gift of a charitable or
educational nature."" 8 The court further held that a donation was
reasonable if it fell within the amount allowed as a tax deduction by the
IRS.' '9 This rule was upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v.
Sullivan,120 in which the Occidental Petroleum Corporation committed
almost $100 million for the construction and operation of a museum to
hold the art collection of Armand Hammer, its CEO and chair.121
Theodora and Kahn seem to imply that a corporation may
donate up to 10 percent of its taxable income (the current limit for taxdeductible contributions) to any legitimate 501(c)(3) organization,
regardless of whether the donation will benefit the corporation in any
way. They leave open the question of how much a corporation may
115. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 122(9) (West 2013). In this category I include states
where one statutory provision authorizes charitable contributions and another authorizes
other contributions in the interests of the corporation. The common factor is that neither set
of states specifically authorizes corporate decision-makers to ignore corporate benefit in
making such contributions.
116. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 2012).
117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(4) (West 2013).
118. 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969).
119. Id
120. 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991).
121. Id. at 54.
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donate to 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, since those donations
are not tax-deductible, at least not as charitable contributions. 122 One
literalist interpretation of the case law is that contributions to social
welfare organizations should not be treated as charitable donations
because they are not tax-deductible under the same provision of the
Internal Revenue Code; on this argument, these contributions should
instead be treated like other types of political spending. Other
interpretations are possible, however. Since 501(c)(4) organizations are
officially devoted to promoting social welfare, they seem at first glance
to serve a similar societal purpose to traditional 501(c)(3) charities. By
that logic, the law should put contributions to both types of
organizations on equal footing, and both should be considered
reasonable so long as they do not exceed 10 percent of taxable income
in aggregate. For the remainder of this Part, I assume that donations to
501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations are treated the same way.
B.

Potential Constraintson PoliticalContributionsto Charitable
Organizations

Current law, however, does not give directors and officers
unbridled discretion to make charitable contributions. First, insiders
may not make such contributions in violation of their fiduciary duties,
particularly the duty of loyalty.123 As mentioned previously, the use of
corporate funds for political purposes will often implicate the personal
interests of directors or managers, whether financial or ideological. If
plaintiff shareholders can establish that a conflict of interest exists, the
business judgment rule should become inapplicable. This will be
difficult in practice, since most courts are likely to hold that a CEO's
ideological agreement with the Heritage Foundation or the Center for
American Progress does not create a sufficiently worrisome conflict of
interest. Even if the plaintiff is successful, it is not clear what would
happen next: since an ordinary charitable contribution is made without
an expectation of receiving a benefit in return, there is no obvious
122. Under some circumstances they are deductible as business expenses.
123. In Kahn v. Sullivan, the lower court rejected the objecting plaintiffs' claim that the
business judgment rule should not apply, but only because "the Objectors had not
established any facts that the Special Committee had any self-interest in the transaction
either from a personal financial interest or from a motive for entrenchment in office." 594
A.2d at 60.
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standard against which to measure a conflicted contribution.
More generally, we should ask whether the current permissive
treatment of corporate charitable contributions should apply to political
spending. In Theodora, the case that defined a "reasonable" contribution
as one that qualified as a tax deduction under the Internal Revenue
Code, the Delaware Chancery Court based its holding on a policy
justification that arguably no longer applies today. The court described
charitable contributions as a means of protecting corporations in general
from public unrest: "[C]ontemporary courts recognize that unless
corporations carry an increasing share of the burden of supporting
charitable and educational causes that the business advantages now
reposed in corporations by law may well prove to be unacceptable to the
representatives of an aroused public." 24 This was written in 1969, a
time when there was considerably more public opposition to the freemarket capitalist system than exists today. The court based its holding
on A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,125 a leading case on
corporate philanthropy. In that case, the Theodora court recounted,
[T]he Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a gift of
$1500 by the plaintiff corporation to Princeton
University, being of the opinion that the trend towards
the transfer of wealth from private industrial
entrepreneurs to corporate institutions, the increase of
taxes on individual income, coupled with steadily
increasing philanthropic needs, necessitate corporate
giving for educational needs even were there no statute
permitting such gifts .... The court also noted that the
gift tended to bolster the free enterprise system and the
general social climate in which plaintiff was nurtured.126
Indeed, A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co., decided in 1953, is

thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the Cold War. After recalling the
efforts of corporations during two world wars and the Great Depression,
the New Jersey Supreme Court continued:

124.
125.
126.

Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969).
98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
257 A.2d at 404.
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[Corporations] now recognize that we are faced with
other, though nonetheless vicious, threats from abroad
which must be withstood without impairing the vigor of
our democratic institutions at home and that otherwise
victory will be pyrrhic indeed. More and more they have
come to recognize that their salvation rests upon sound
economic and social environment [sic] which in turn
rests in no insignificant part upon free and vigorous
nongovernmental institutions of learning. 127
In other words, to fight off communism, we need corporations
to give money to Princeton University. 128
Virtually none of these justifications for corporate philanthropy
is still relevant. The top tax rate on ordinary income has fallen from
ninety-one percent in 1953 and seventy-seven percent in 1969 to 44.6
percent in 2013.129 More importantly, corporate dividends are now
taxed as long-term capital gains, so the tax rate on dividends has fallen
from ninety-one percent to twenty-five percent, eliminating the tax
incentive during the post-World War II period for corporations to hold
on to their profits. The shareholder value revolution of the past three
decades has led corporations to significantly increase the share of
profits that they distribute to shareholders, whether as dividends or
stock buybacks. A huge increase in income inequality has swelled the
ranks of the super-rich, whose charitable contributions dwarf those of
any corporation. 130 In 2011, corporations were responsible for less than
five percent of the $298 billion donated to charitable organizations in

127. 98 A.2d at 586.
128. A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. may itself be the result of collusion between the
parties and the court, which wanted to authorize corporate charitable contributions for
public policy reasons. Geoffrey Miller, Narrative and Truth in Judicial Opinions:
CorporateCharitable Giving Cases, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 831, 837-41 (2009). If that is
true, the entire line of Delaware cases allowing corporations to donate to charities is
founded on a sham to begin with.
129. Citizens for Tax Justice, Top Federal Income Tax Rates Since 1913,(Nov. 2011),
http://www.ctj.org/pdf/regcg.pdf.
130. In 2006, for example, Warren Buffett committed to donate stock worth over $37
billion at the time. Timothy L. O'Brien & Stephanie Saul, Buffett to Give Bulk of His
Fortune to Gates Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 26, 2006, at Al. At least ninety-two superwealthy families have signed the Giving Pledge, promising to donate at least half of their
wealth for charitable purposes. Geoffrey A. Fowler, More Billionaires Vow to Give Money
Away, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2012, at A7.
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the United States. 131 The American charitable sector has little need for
corporate philanthropy (particularly educational institutions like
Princeton University, which has a $17 billion endowmentl 32). The idea
that corporate giving is necessary to protect the free enterprise system
also seems far-fetched. The Cold War is over, American-style
capitalism has no serious rival as an economic system, and what diffuse
antipathy toward corporations exists has no organized political
expression. The "salvation" of the American corporation is not at stake,
and corporations play only a bit part in the maintenance of our vital
"democratic institutions."
This implies that we should rethink how corporate law treats
charitable contributions. Recall that, in states like Delaware, the letter of
the statute simply grants corporations the power to make contributions
to charitable organizations, just as it grants them the power to buy and
sell property. Basic governance principles dictate that a corporation's
powers should be used for the benefit of the corporation and its
shareholders. The vague idea that corporations should contribute to the
common good has led courts to suspend that basic rule in the case of
charitable donations, arguing from public policy grounds that no longer
apply. The result is that the law imposes little restraint on donations
made by corporate insiders: "in most states, managers may approve
contributions as they choose, for any purpose they choose, to whatever
qualifying charity they decide, and without regard to shareholder
interests." 133
The simplest solution would be for courts to simply conclude
that charitable contributions must be made with the expectation of some
net benefit to the corporation, as is the case with ordinary business
decisions. A manager would not be allowed to pay $100 for goods
worth $50, and by the same token the same manager should not be
allowed to contribute $100 if the expected returns to the corporation
(marketing, community goodwill, other collateral benefits) are only

131.

Giving

Statistics,

CHARITY

NAVIGATOR,

http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay-content.view&cpid=42 (last visited May
24, 2013).
132. Martin Mbugua, Princeton Endowment Earns 3.1 Percent Return, Boosts 10-Year
Average,

PRINCETON

UNIVERSITY

(Oct.

http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S35/06/60SO4/index.xml.
133. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 114, at 982.

19,

2012),

290

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 18

$50. 134 This might seem like a stark about-face for the courts. But it is
important to bear in mind that we are dealing with the interpretation of
an ambiguous statute, not the revision of a statute, at least in Delaware
and similar states. 35 While perhaps unlikely, it is not implausible that a
court could decide to hold charitable contributions to the same standards
as other business decisions.
Alternatively, the courts could require a net corporate benefit for
contributions to politically oriented organizations, but continue to treat
donations to other charities according to the principles of Theodora and
Kahn. The basis for this distinction is that the public policy concerns
that justify traditional corporate philanthropy-in A. P. Smith
ManufacturingCo., the court cites gifts to universities, local community
chests, the American Red Cross, the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, and 4H Clubs' 36 -do not justify corporate intervention in politics. While
corporate philanthropy might marginally increase public support for
free market capitalism, it is hard to see how corporate involvement in
politics could have that effect-especially given people's largely
negative perceptions of corporate political activity. In a 2012 poll,
eighty-nine percent of respondents agreed that there is "[t]oo much
corporate money in politics." 1 37 This is true even though no one really
knows how much corporate money there is in politics; the point is that
people are unlikely to think more fondly of corporations because they
are contributing to political causes. Donations in general might also
promote the common good by helping to meet the "steadily increasing

134. This standard would also mean that corporate managers could no longer force the
federal government (and, by extension, taxpayers) to contribute to their preferred charities;
under the current system, with a thirty-five percent marginal corporate tax rate, a $100
donation is in effect split between $65 from the corporation and $35 from the government.
Instead, charitable contributions would be limited to legitimate business expenses (those that
have the expectation of benefitting the company), which would be deductible either way.
135. Furthermore, there is at least some support in the Delaware cases for such an
interpretation. In Theodora, the court pointed to particular benefits that the corporation and
its shareholders could receive as a result of the contested contribution. The Chancery Court
opinion on appeal in Kahn (Sullivan v. Hammer, CIV. A. No. 10823, 1990 WL 114223
(Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990)) can be read to imply that "a benefit to the corporation must
accompany a charitable contribution." Balotti & Hanks, supra note 114, at 978. In that
matter, both the Chancery Court and the Supreme Court were constrained by the fact that
they were reviewing a settlement reached between the litigants.
136. 98 A.2d 581, 585 (N.J. 1953).
137. Brad Bannon, Support for Reform of Corporate Political Spending Practices,
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philanthropic needs" referred to by in Theodora. But while many people
might think there are unmet needs for funding for medical research, or
education, or homeless shelters, few people think that what our society
needs are more political white papers, lobbying campaigns, or issue ads.
Although a functioning democracy requires organized interest groups,
those groups by their very nature can appeal to their supporters' selfinterest; they do not depend on the type of philanthropic generosity
envisioned by A.P. Smith ManufacturingCo. and Theodora.

Since contributions to political charities and social welfare
organizations do not promote the public policy ends envisioned by the
courts, they should not benefit from the special treatment that courts
have traditionally applied to charitable contributions. This principle
would require courts to draw lines between political and non-political
charities, which could be done in various ways. Perhaps the simplest
would be to require plaintiff shareholders to establish that a given
charity is primarily devoted to influencing public policy rather than,
say, research or education. While this might be difficult to prove for
many inside-the-Beltway think tanks, it should be straightforward for
social welfare organizations that spend virtually all their money on
political advertisements.
In either case-whether an expected net benefit is required for
all charitable contributions or just for those to politically oriented
organizations-a donation to a politically oriented charity would be
treated like any other political donation, under the principles discussed
in the previous Part. To avoid liability, directors and officers would
have to have a reasonable basis for believing that their contributions
would have expected benefits exceeding their costs; simply asserting
that donating money to Princeton University would help the corporation
would not be enough. In summary, the corporate governance of political
contributions should not depend on whether the recipient is a 501(c)(3),
501(c)(4), or 501(c)(6) organization, or a super PAC. In all cases, such
contributions should only be made if they are reasonably believed, on
an informed basis, to be in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.
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VI. POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

A decision by courts to apply a higher degree of scrutiny to
corporate political activity, as suggested in Part IV.B.3, above, could
have the effect of reducing the volume of corporate contributions to
political organizations, which could be seen as reducing the volume of
political speech by corporations. This raises the question whether a
court, by raising the bar for insider defendants seeking to defeat a
shareholder challenge, is impermissibly restricting the corporation's
right to free speech under the First Amendment.13 8
It seems unlikely that this type of heightened scrutiny would be
found unconstitutional, for several reasons. As a starting point, there is
no restriction on the corporation's right to engage in political speech.
Given that right, and assuming that donations of money are the
functional equivalent of speech, the present question is what corporate
governance principles determine what the corporation actually
"says."l139 After all, neither an ordinary shareholder, nor an ordinary
employee, nor a union representing a majority of a corporation's
employees may unilaterally decide what the corporation says. Although
corporate law places most operating decisions in the hands of the board
and the managers it selects, this is not an absolute principle, much less a
constitutional one. There must be some set of legal rules that determine
who among a corporation's stakeholders can speak for the corporation;
the simple fact that one set of legal rules results in a lesser volume of
political donations than another cannot imply that the latter is
constitutional while the former is not. Short of a regime that makes it
extremely difficult for a corporation to engage in political speech-such
as, for example, a requirement that political activities receive
unanimous shareholder approval-any set of rules that is reasonably
typical of corporate law in general should be constitutionally
permissible.
Second, consider the substance of the heightened scrutiny
suggested above. In essence, the proposal is to require that decisions
138. A decision by courts to require that directors and officers be sufficiently informed
when making political contributions, as suggested in Part IV.A, above, should not present
any constitutional concerns. In that case, the courts would simply be applying a rule that
governs all corporate activity. See Brudney, supra note 36, at 254-55.
139. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., CorporatePoliticalSpeech: Who
Decides? 124 HARv. L. REv. 83, 86 (2010).
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regarding political contributions be taken in the good faith belief, on a
reasonably informed basis, that those contributions will benefit the
corporation. This is the same standard that corporate law already applies
to other transactions where there is significant potential for a conflict of
interest, not a new hurdle specifically aimed at political speech. Saying
that this standard is unconstitutional is the same as saying that the
Constitution demands that a particular group of corporate insiders be
allowed to unilaterally determine what the corporation says, in defiance
of general principles of corporate law.
Third, if such a standard would reduce the volume of corporate
political speech, it is a particular kind of speech that would be deterred:
political contributions that do not serve the overall interests of the
corporation and its shareholders. Contributions that do benefit the
corporation, for traditional profit-maximization reasons, would remain
safe from shareholder attack, since insider defendants would only have
to show a reasonable basis for making those contributions. It is hard to
see how a corporation's right to free speech could be construed to
require that corporate insiders be allowed to make political
contributions that are in their own interests but not in the interests of the
corporation itself.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Citizens United itself
acknowledged the importance of "corporate democracy" in regulating
corporate speech. The Court brushed off the argument that independent
political expenditures by corporations would coerce shareholders to
fund political speech, citing Bellotti: "There is, furthermore, little
evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders 'through the
procedures of corporate democracy."' 1 40 That passage from Bellotti,
cited in full above, specifically referred to "the judicial remedy of a
derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements alleged to have
been made for improper corporate purposes or merely to further the
personal interests of management."141 My argument, above, is simply
that the courts should evaluate those derivative suits recommended by
the Supreme Court using a legal standard, based on ordinary principles
of corporate law, that is appropriate to the legal issues that they present.
The standard itself-requiring that insiders have an informed basis for
140. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (quoting First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
141. 435 U.S. at 794.
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believing that a contribution benefits the corporation-substantively
reiterates the basic premise of all derivative suits. Corporate democracy,
like any democracy, requires a set of rules. For corporate democracy to
work, those rules should be chosen to maximize the chances that
corporations will generally act in the best interests of their
shareholders-not to enshrine the prerogative of directors and officers
to speak for the corporation.
VII. WHAT CORPORATE LAW CAN ACCOMPLISH
This paper attempts to contribute to the solution of an important
corporate governance problem. Citizens United and related decisions
have expanded the power of corporations to intervene in the political
process, but it is far from clear, as a practical matter, who should have
the authority to exercise that power. While corporate law delegates most
powers to the discretion of directors and officers, corporate political
activity presents the particular risk that those insiders will use their
power to further their personal interests rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders.
There are various plausible solutions to this problem and to the
related, larger, and more debatable problem of excessive corporate
influence in American politics. Since Citizens United, several legal,
regulatory, and legislative initiatives have attempted to require that
corporations disclose their political spending. These include NYSCRF's
books-and-records suit against Qualcomm, the request that the SEC
require disclosure of political spending, and the DISCLOSE Act, which
would have increased mandatory disclosure of election-related spending
but failed to clear Congress in 2010. One could envision considerably
broader solutions, such as, at one extreme, an electoral system based on
mandatory public financing.
This paper has outlined various arguments for bringing
corporate political spending under closer judicial scrutiny and thereby
giving shareholders more influence over that spending. This issue is
important for two reasons. First, even if it is required, disclosure is not a
panacea. For example, it is not clear that increased required disclosure
of executive compensation will produce any substantive change in
actual compensation practices. Even if shareholders can find out how a
corporation is spending its money, in many cases they will still need a
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way to challenge that spending. Otherwise, executives of an otherwise
successful and profitable company will often be able to continue
business as usual when it comes to politics.
Second, the solutions proposed by this paper could be
implemented by the courts now, without requiring an act of Congress
(or the Delaware General Assembly) or a ruling by the SEC. The path
of least resistance is for the courts to approve political contributions as
valid exercises of business judgment (and to rubber-stamp all charitable
contributions that qualify for a tax deduction), but this deference is not
the necessary result of fundamental constitutional or even statutory
principles. Both the business judgment rule and the "reasonableness"
test for charitable contributions are the product of policy judgments by
previous courts: attempts to balance the principle of shareholder
primacy with the need for corporate risk-taking, in one case, and with
the perceived need to further the public good, in the other. To the extent
that judges today believe that the lack of shareholder oversight of
corporate political spending represents an important problem, corporate
law already provides the tools necessary to do something about it.
Furthermore, there is a clear precedent in the Delaware courts for
increasing scrutiny of insider behavior as new opportunities for conflict
appear: this is exactly what they did beginning in the 1980s in response
to a wave of hostile takeovers and the invention of a new array of
creative takeover defenses.
How our political, regulatory, and legal systems will eventually
adapt to the increase in corporations' potential political influence is
unclear today. This paper argues for a legal regime in which corporate
political spending must be aligned with the interests of shareholders,
shareholders can sue to challenge particular political contributions, and
corporate insiders must defend the substance of their spending decisions
in court. Compared to the current situation, that would be an important
step forward.

